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ABSTRACT 
Expenditures on grants (Hibah) and sosial assistance (Bansos) which 
are included in the category of discretionary funds are very 
vulnerable to be used as campaign funds to gain popularity of 
incumbent couples. The purpose of this study is to investigate the 
possibility of an indication of abuse of discretionary funds in the 
APBD. This study used an interactive analysis model using three 
stages, namely; data condensation, presentation of concluding data, 
and verification. The results of this study indicated that the allocation 
of regional expenditures on grants and sosial assistance that carried 
out regional head election (Pemilukada) with the incumbent 
candidates is greater than before the election, which means there 
was the use of incumbent discretionary funds for their political 
interests. The allocation of regional discretionary funds that carried 
out the election with incumbent candidates was greater than the 
regions that do not implement the election. Increased of discretionary 
funds continue to occur despite the unhealthy / deficit regional 
financial condition. It coupled with the findings of the allocation of 
expenditure of goods distributed through 100 SKPD of Rp. 
504,938,020,140,34 to the public. This was a strong indication that 
the incumbent was trying to keep providing the assistance to attract 
voters  on the Pemilukada in 2015. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This regional development was carried out as an integral part of national 
development that was carried out through regional autonomy, so it provided 
opportunities for increasing democracy and regional performance. The 
implementation of autonomy was also useful in enhancing the welfare of the 
community towards an active and democratic civil society, for this reason, the 
community participation, openness and accountability to society are needed. 
To support the implementation of regional autonomy through the provision of 
financing sources based on the principle of decentralization, it was necessary to 
regulate the financial balance between the central and regional governments in the 
form of a financial system. This financial system is used to finance the decentralization 
work program implemented in areas commonly referred as the Regional Budget 
(APBD). 
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 One of the decentralization activities is the direct implementation of the 
Regional Head General Election in each region. Based on data from the Indonesian 
Power of Democracy and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in 2009, Indonesia has 
conducted Regional Head Elections (Pemilukada) directly since 2005 in each district / 
city. The activity of Pemilukada is the authority and responsibility of the regional 
government, regardless that the central government which only serves as a supervisory 
function. 
 During the election of regional heads, incumbent of regional heads tended to 
commit political bribery, to purchases the voters and taking various types of shopping 
and grants to cover a very large campaign expenditure (Dahlberg & Johansson, 2002). 
However, during the second period where regional heads cannot be re-elected, 
regional heads will tend to commit corruption in order to seek a collateral when the 
position is stepped down (Ferraz & Finan, 2011). The regional head who ends his 
leadership period and will go back to becoming a candidate for regional head will tend 
to use policy funds (discetionary funds) to increase his popularity in order to be re-
elected in the next period (Sjahrir, Kis-katos, & Schulze, 2013). 
 Allegations of potential APBD irregularities will increase when the regional head 
re-nominates after his leadership period or incumbent, considering that they have to 
compete again, as not to lose the power. Incumbent will make changes in the 
composition of the budget to influence the voters (Drazen & Eslava, 2006). This can 
be seen from the needs of regional heads when conducting campaigns to be re-elected 
in the next period, so that the regional head will take various kinds of shopping and 
grants from other parties and will make a vote purchase to be re-elected (Dahlberg & 
Johansson, 2002). Grant Expenditures and Social Assistance Expenditures, is one of 
the expenditure posts that can be used by candidates for incumbent regional heads to 
lure the hearts of voters to get support. Incumbent will make changes to the 
composition of the budget to influence the voters (Drazen & Eslava, 2006). 
 Forum Himpunan Kelompok Kerja (FH Pokja) 30, budget activists of Samarinda 
City believes that grants and social assistance are very vulnerable to be used as 
campaign funds to gain popularity of incumbent couples in the Samarinda Regional 
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Election. Data compiled by Pokja 30 states that in 2013, the total grant’s funds 
disbursed reached Rp 43 billion. This amount increased in 2014, where the grant was 
allocated Rp 136 billion. Also in 2015, not including the Revised APBD, the grant’s 
funds have been allocated Rp 164 billion, while Bansos for the same year is Rp 
943,750,000. 
 Based on that data, the author wants to see the reality that happened and 
conclude whether there is indeed a use of discretionary funds before and during the 
2015 regional head general election in Samarinda City and is that an incumbent effort 
in the form of a political strategy to increase electability, maintain an incumbent voice 
base or something other. This study examined in the regulation, implementation and 
looks at aspects of grant and Bansos budgeting. Therefore, in this study, the author 
asks two questions. First, how was the allocation of discretionary funds before and 
during the Pemilukada? How was discretionary fund allocation compared to regional 
financial conditions? Then, how is the allocation of regional discretionary funds 
between the region that carry out Pemilukada with incumbent candidates, with the 
regions that do not implement Pemilukada? 
 Based on the description above, the researcher tries to link the legitimacy theory 
and agency theory. The emergence of legitimacy theory begins with an organization / 
company that seeks to establish harmony between social and environmental values 
with their business activities so that norms of business behavior can be accepted in a 
larger social system in which they are a part. This theory becomes important when 
applied to the public sector, especially social acceptance of government organizations 
led by regional heads who are legitimized by their people. Legitimacy according to 
Suchman, (1995) is defined as follows: 
“Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs, and definitions.” 
The application of legitimacy theory in the public sector can be seen when the 
regional head maintains legitimacy in order to be re-elected in the second period and 
not to lose from the otential competitors by trying as much as possible to draw 
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sympathy from the people in various ways. One of choice is to provide grants and 
social assistance to improve its image in the community before the Pemilukada. 
According to the relationship between Ritonga & Alam's theory of agency and 
budgeting, (Ritonga & Alam, 2010), it can be seen as a transaction in the form of a 
mandate contract given to agents (executives) within the framework of institutional 
structures with different levels. In accordance with what is stated in the agency theory, 
that principals and agents have their own interests, so that conflicts over these 
interests have the potential to occur at any time. The agent has the ability to further 
highlight his interests because he has more information than the principal, this is 
because the agent is in operational control in the field. So the agent prefers 
alternatives that benefit him, by deceiving and imposing losses on the principal 
Fozard, S., (2001) in Ritonga & Alam, (2010) 
This research was a qualitative descriptive study. This research was conducted 
in the City of Samarinda. This location was chosen because the author portrays the 
increasing discretionary fund phenomenon in the lead up to the 2015 post-conflict 
local election. This study used interactive model data analysis 
A. Research Focus 
The focus or indicators measured in this study are: 
1. Allocation of discretionary funds before and during the Pemilukada. 
2. Allocation of discretionary fund compared to regional financial conditions. 
3. Differencies between allocation of regional discretionary funds that carry out 
Pemilukada with incumbent candidates with the regions that do not implement 
Pemilukada. 
B. Data Collection Techniques 
Data collection techniques in this study used triangulation methods which are done by 
comparing information or data in different ways. To obtain the truth of reliable 
information and a complete picture of certain information, researchers used 
interviews and observations to check the truth. In addition, researchers also used 
different informants to check the truth of the information. Through various 
perspectives it is hoped that results can be obtained close to the truth. Therefore, this 
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stage of triangulation is carried out if the data or information obtained from the 
subject or research informant is in doubt. 
C. Analysis Tools 
This study used an interactive model data analysis introduced by Miles, Huberman, & 
Saldaña, (2014), where there were three activities that occur simultaneously; data 
condensation, presentation of concluding data, and verification. 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
Spending on social assistance grants and expenditures is a shopping outpost 
that can be used for incumbent candidates to lure the voters to get votes. This reason 
is a basic because in Permendagri 59 of 2007 which was a revision of Permendagri 13 
of 2006, these two types of expenditure are part of the indirect expenditure 
component which distribution does not go through programs and activities and does 
not have certain performance targets, so the allocation tends to be subjective (political 
interest) and the realization of the expenditure is based on the initiative of the Mayor 
in the form of Regional Head Regulations. 
According to Halim & Kusufi, (2012), opportunistic of incumbent candidates  
in the process of drafting the APBD ahead of the implementation of the Regional 
Head General Election were very strong. As an incumbent candidate, the regional 
head that will compete in Pemilukada has a great opportunity to utilize spending posts 
on the APBD for their interests. The APBD drafting process begins with proposals 
submitted by executives (Regional Governments) which are indicated to be of the 
highest importance to executive interests. With the superiority of power it has, the 
incumbent will tend to propose a budget that can enlarge its agency, both financially 
and non-financially. 
Minister of Home Affairs, Tjahjo Kumolo, even stated that Bansos funds had 
increased by 1000 percent before the implementation of regional elections. He added 
that there were 89 regions that increased to 1000 percent in the Indonesian Forum 
data for Budget Transparency (FITRA), ICW, and the Ministry of Home Affairs' 
Finance Director. The second level APBD for the Regency and City is jointly approved 
by the Governor, Regent, Mayor, and DPRD so that data negotiation is very 
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vulnerable. Data obtained by the election monitoring agency shows an increase in the 
number of social assistance funds and grants in the APBD whose regional heads 
advanced in the 2015 General Election, so that the increase was considered to be 
potentially misused to carry out money politics. 
A. Discretionary Fund Allocation Before and During the Regional Election 
The trend of increasing discretionary funds that also occurred in the city of 
Samarinda reflected in the financial statements of local governments in the 2013-2015 
budget year, where the upward trend only occurred before the election process that 
would take place. The Pokja 30 Director, Carolus Tuah, said that the recipients of 
social assistance funds and grants certainly had political affiliation as incumbent 
supporters. The lack of role in encouraging public openness by the bearer party in the 
2015 General Election, which was called Carolus Tuah, made everything closed, 
including the recipient of this government assistance fund. 
This study tried to look at the proportion of discretionary fund allocations 
before and during the Pemilukada, based on the Samarinda City Regional 
Government Financial Report (LKPD) 2013-2015 which was audited by the BPK. The 
proportion of regional grant expenditures with incumbent candidates experienced an 
increase before the Pemilukada, but after the Pemilukada the grant expenditure 
experienced a drastic decline from before the Pemilukada became a strong indication 
that the incumbent carried out political discretionary funds before the Pemilukada in 
order to increase its popularity with the aim of being elected again in the 2015 
General Election. It can be seen in the graph below: 
 
Figure 1. Samarinda City Grants Shopping Trends 2013-2016 
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Government policy in providing Bansos is given selectively, not continuously or non-
binding (giving is not mandatory and does not have to be given every year), except in 
certain circumstances and has the clarity of the allocation of its use by considering 
regional financial capabilities. Social assistance spending is provided in accordance 
with the provisions of Permendagri No. 39 of 2012 concerning Guidelines for 
Granting Grants and Bansos sourced from Regional Revenues and Expenditures. 
After the post-conflict local election period, there was a significant decrease of 74.6%, 
but there was an increase in social assistance spending accounts of 47%. For more 
details, the allocation of the Bansos of Samarinda City can be seen in the graph below: 
 
Figure 2. Trend of Samarinda City Social Assistance Expenditure for 2013-2016 
In the 2015 budget year, the Samarinda City Government budgeted goods and 
services worth Rp. 959,428,741,498.46 and realized worth Rp. 813,270,571,725.38. 
The realization included Rp. 504,938,020,140,34 is used for the expenditure of goods 
delivered to the community, namely farmer groups, breeders groups, and business 
groups managed by 100 Technical SKPD. 
If it is correlated with the City of Samarinda Regional Medium Term 
Development Plan (RPJMD) 2011-2015, the main focus of the development of the 
potential of Samarinda City in the trade, hotels, and restaurants sector, not on the 
agricultural and plantation sectors. Based on the Samarinda City RPJMD 2011-2015 
the agriculture and fisheries sector is not is a sector that can be relied upon as the 
backbone of the economy, but is utilized in supporting grill resistance. The 
agricultural sector includes food crops, plantations, forestry, livestock, and fisheries. 
The contribution of the agricultural sector (agriculture) tends to be fixed and very 
small, from 2.38% in 2000 to 2.20% in 2008. Based on this, the development of the 
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agricultural sector in Samarinda is not the main sector as the backbone of the 
economy. The development of the agricultural sector is directed at meeting the basic 
needs themselves as well as supporting industrial activities. 
However, the goods shopping account managed by 100 Technical SKPD is 
handed over to the community, namely farmer groups and business groups, which is a 
separate problem in the RPJMD of agriculture and plantations, not a priority program, 
but the budget allocation that given is very large. This is also an indication of the 
incumbent's use of discretionary funds as an agent who has legitimacy in the 
government for the sake of his popularity in the 2015 Pemilukada. 
The granting of grants and Bansos must hold on to the principles of justice, 
propriety, rationality, and broad benefits for the community so that they are far from 
personal and group interests, and political interests of the elements of local 
government. Therefore, the government issued Permendagri Number 32 of 2011 
concerning Guidelines for Granting Grants and Social Assistance sourced from the 
APBD, which was changed to Permendagri No. 39 of 2012 with the process of 
disbursing grants and Bansos that were more stringent than the previous process. 
The stages and mechanism of the budget formulation process between grant 
and social assistance spending from 2009 to 2013 have no fundamental differences. 
After the issuance of Pemendagri No. 39 of 2012, grant and social assistance 
budgeting no longer uses the package system, but rather includes the recipient's name, 
recipient's address, and the amount of the grant and social assistance in Annex III of 
the Regional Head Regulation on the APBD Description. 
The strict regulation does not guarantee that the budget for grants and social 
assistance is not misused for personal gain, especially in the lead up to the 2015 
General Election. Based on Permendagri No. 21 of 2011, which is the second change 
from Permendagri No. 13 of 2006, this grant and social assistance expenditure is 
included in the expenditure category indirectly whose allocation is not based on 
certain performance targets so that the determination of the amount of the budget 
tends to be subjective and susceptible to the corruption. 
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Another problem arised from the granting of grants that ensnare the chairman 
of the KNPI Samarinda DPD Harman Al Idrus, Harman officially becomes a suspect 
on May 20, 2016. He allegedly misused the KNPI Samarinda grant for the 2013–2014 
period. In addition, there are allegations of inflation of activity funds. To note, in 
2013, KNPI Samarinda received a grant from Samarinda's pure APBD of Rp. 3 
billion, plus Rp. 1.5 billion from the revised APBD. Then in 2014, again received a 
grant of Rp. 3 billion from the pure APBD and an additional Rp. 2 billion through 
the APBD changes. 
Based on the results of the analysis it is known that the proportion of Grant 
Expenditures and for incumbent candidates at the time of the Pemilukada was greater 
than before the implementation of the Pemilukada. Thus the results of this study also 
reinforced the results of research conducted by 6 [6]. It is known that the allocation of 
grant expenditure for regions with incumbent candidates at the time of the 
Pemilukada was greater than before the implementation of the Pemilukada, and 
research conducted by Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) in 2008 in collaboration 
with Murdoch University, found an increase in the allocation of expenditure on 
grants and social assistance spending in the APBD during the 2008 General Election 
in Tabanan (Bali), Bau-Bau City (Southeast Sulawesi), and Bandung City (West Java) 
followed by candidate wins incumbent. Executives who were agents receive authority 
and exercise authority and also have discretionary power that can be utilized to 
maintain their position in the government by using discretionary funds that can be 
freely channeled due to indirect types of spending. With an indication of the 
incumbent's APBD utilization for its candidacy again, the government needs to make a 
tighter control on spending on aid and social assistance expenditures starting from the 
procedures for budgeting, implementation, reporting and control. However, the use of 
public funds is disguised as a populist policy / program so that it has a legal basis and 
the consequences are not easily accused of abuse of power or election violations. 
B. Discretionary fund allocation compared to regional financial conditions 
Permendagri Number 32 of 2011 jo. Permendagri No. 39 of 2012 Article 4 
and Article 22 states that the allocation of the budget for grants and social assistance 
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must take into account the regional financial capacity after prioritizing the fulfillment 
of obligatory affairs expenditure by taking into account the principles of justice, 
propriety, rationality, and benefits for the community. Regional financial capability in 
terms of budget perspective as a managerial control tool states that the government 
has enough money to fulfill its obligations 9 [9]. 
Thus, the financial capacity of this region can be measured by fiscal space. 
Fiscal space is a concept to measure the flexibility that local governments have in 
allocating APBD to finance activities that are regional priorities. The greater the fiscal 
space that an area has, the greater the flexibility that local governments have to 
allocate their expenditure. Based on research 10 [10], fiscal space has a positive 
influence on the performance of local government, but on the contrary it can be used 
as an opportunity to commit corruption. The allocation of expenditure on grants and 
social assistance with the personal motives of the head of the region is also an 
indication of undercover corruption. 
The amount of budget allocation for grant and social assistance expenditure 
was inseparable from the characteristics of each region. Research 11 [11] states that of 
several characteristics of local government, namely the independence ratio, human 
development index, legislative size, and status; only status that affects the allocation of 
social assistance spending. 
In 2013-2015 the financial condition of Samarinda City continued to 
experience a budget deficit, but continued to allocate discretionary funds which 
basically disrupted the budget performance that had been prepared without paying 
attention to mandatory and non-compliance. So this reinforces the alleged use of the 
incumbent's discretionary fund for his candidacy again. More can be seen in the graph 
below: 
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Figure 3. Discretionary Fund Allocation Compared to Regional Financial Conditions in 2013-2015 
 
C. Allocation of Regional Discretionary Funds that Execute Election with 
Incumbent Candidates with Regions that Do Not Implement Election 
Based on the results of the analysis, it is known that the proportion of 
discretionary fund allocation in implementing regions of the Pemilukada with 
incumbent candidates is greater than the proportion of grant expenditure and social 
assistance spending in regions that do not implement Pemilukada. With the 
indication of the incumbent's APBD utilization for its candidacy again, the 
government needs to make a tighter financial control for Grant Expenditures and 
Social Assistance Expenditures. But the government must balance between fiscal 
decentralization and regulatory rigor. That is, there are complete and firm rules, but 
they do not reduce the authority of the regions to manage their regional finances 
according to the needs and aspirations of their people. However, the use of public 
funds is disguised as a populist policy / program so that it has a legal basis and the 
consequences are not easily accused of abuse of power or election violations. The 
results regarding the comparison of Samarinda City grant expenditure and Penajam 
Paser Utara District can be seen in the graph below: 
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Figure 4. Comparison of Samarinda City Grants and Penajam Paser Utara District Expenditures 2013-2015 
Whereas social assistance spending has decreased, for more details can be seen in the 
notes below :  
 
 
Figure 5. Comparison of Samarinda City Social Assistance Expenditures and Penajam Paser Utara 
District 2013-2015 
With an indication of the incumbent's APBD utilization for its candidacy 
again, there should be stricter supervision by both DPRD members and the 
Government Internal Supervisory Apparatus (APIP) on the allocation and realization 
of grant and social assistance expenditures especially towards the political year to be 
right on target. Researchers also suggest restrictions on the allocation of expenditure 
on grants and social assistance based on the ability of regional finances (fiscal space) as 
outlined in government regulation policies as improvements to existing rules so that 
the allocation of grant and social assistance budgets is controlled through a system of 
rules. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the discussion that has been done, the conclusion of this study are: 
1. Allocation of regional discretionary funds with incumbent candidates before and 
during Pemilukada experienced a drastic increase in the lead up to Pemilukada 
and social assistance spending decreased by a tendency to fluctuate but there were 
findings of the allocation of goods expenditure in 2015 distributed through 100 
Technical SKPD of Rp. 504,938,020,140.34 to the public at a time when regional 
financial conditions are in deficit. 
2. There is an increase in expenditure on grant and social assistance spending, still 
occurring despite the financial condition of the 2013-2015 budget deficit. This is 
an indication that the incumbent is trying to keep providing assistance to attract 
voters' interest on Pemilukada in 2015. 
3. Furthermore, the proportion of the allocation of discretionary funds in the 
implementing regions of Pemilukada with incumbent candidates is greater than 
the proportion of discretionary funds in regions that do not implement 
Pemilukada. Based on the conclusions drawn from the research findings, it is 
suspected that there is a political discretionary fund by the incumbent for its 
political interests. 
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